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Does trade improve lives? To the public, one dramatic explanation
for improved living standards is the decline in deaths from violence
and genocide, and in the number of wars and political conﬂicts
(Economist, 2008). This paper takes the growth of trade variety as an
integral part of the globalization process, and examines its association
with the level of internal and external political conﬂicts across
countries. The results from panel data estimation suggests that there
are conﬂict-reducing gains from variety growth.
Following Broda and Weinstein (2004), trade variety is measured
by the average number of importing sources per imported product. A
panel data on imports of 134 countries are taken from the NBER-
United Nations Trade Data 1962–2000. This data cover 433 product
categories at 4-digit Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC).
Because the SITC classiﬁcation went through a major change in 1983,
the present sample starts from 1984 onwards. The measures of
political conﬂict are extracted from the international political risk
scores, compiled by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG
reports for each country a composite political risk indicator, which is aferee, Ho Kong Weng, Euston
Chulalongkorn University for
chool of Humanities, Arts, and
l rights reserved.combination of scores on internal conﬂicts, external conﬂicts,
corruption, bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, ethnic
tensions, government stability, law and order, military in politics, and
religious tensions. The paper focuses on the internal and the external
conﬂict components, taking the composite risk score as a proxy for a
country's overall political conﬂict level. Another possible measure is
the number of casualties of wars,1 but using it will underestimate the
extent of internal and external political conﬂicts.
Fig. 1 plots the average numbers of imported product variety and
the average scores on political conﬂict (higher score = more conﬂicts)
across countries by their income groups.2 From 1985 to 2000, a
percentage increase in trade variety of the high-income, the upper-
middle income, the lower-middle income, and the low-income
countries are 53, 68, 51, and 31, respectively. These groups of countries
also witness their exposure to political conﬂicts fall by 7, 9, 7, and 5%,
respectively. For themiddle-incomeand the low-income countries, the
internal conﬂicts dropped by 10% and the external conﬂicts by 30%.
Controlling for a time trend, could the growth of trade variety con-
tribute to the observed world-wide reduction in the level of political
conﬂicts?1 International Peace Research Institute (Oslo) provides the statistics online at www.
prio.no.
2 World Bank’s per capita income classiﬁcation.
Table 1
Baseline estimation
Political conﬂict Internal conﬂict External conﬂict Overall conﬂict
Beta [S.e.] Beta [S.e.] Beta [S.e.]
(134 countries; average years per country=12)
LSDV ﬁxed-effects
Lagged conﬂict 0.83 (0.01)⁎⁎⁎ 0.80 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎ 0.81 (0.01)⁎⁎⁎
Variety growth −0.42 (0.12)⁎⁎⁎ −0.31 (0.14)⁎⁎ −0.15 (0.05)⁎⁎⁎
×Middle income 0.29 (0.15)⁎ 0.08 (0.18) 0.03 (0.06)
×Low income 0.42 (0.17)⁎⁎ 0.35 (0.20)⁎ 0.01 (0.07)
R2 0.70 0.67 0.78
GMM dynamic panel using annual variety growth
Lagged conﬂict 0.91 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎ 0.93 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎ 0.76 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎
Variety growth −0.52 (0.12)⁎⁎⁎ −0.35 (0.15)⁎⁎ −0.13 (0.05)⁎⁎⁎
×Middle income 0.40 (0.16)⁎⁎ 0.36 (0.20)⁎ 0.03 (0.06)
×Low income 0.60 (0.17)⁎⁎⁎ 0.46 (0.22)⁎⁎ 0.02 (0.07)
GMM dynamic panel using 5-year average variety growth
Lagged conﬂict 0.85 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎ 0.93 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎ 0.74 (0.02)⁎⁎⁎
Variety growth −2.15 (0.38)⁎⁎⁎ −1.07 (0.48)⁎⁎ −0.26 (0.15)⁎
×Middle income −0.23 (0.52) 1.10 (0.64)⁎ −0.36 (0.21)⁎
×Low income 1.22 (0.62)⁎⁎ 0.97 (0.80) −0.06 (0.24)
Variables are in logs. The regression equation is Conﬂictti +αConﬂictt−1i +βVariety
Growtht −1i +θ′[Variety Growtht− 1i ×Incomei]+t+λt +ηi +εti.
The estimation also includes a constant and a time trend (coefﬁcients not reported).
Standard errors are in parentheses. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎ signiﬁes statistically signiﬁcance at 1, 5,
and 10% level, respectively.
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Let i denotes country and t time period. The regression equation is
Conflictit = αConflict
i
t−1 + βVariety Growth
i
t−1
+ θV Variety Growthit−1×Income
i
h i
+ t + λt + ηi + eit
ð1Þ
The speciﬁcation (1) takes into account the effects of past political
conﬂicts, a time trend (t), a time ﬁxed effect (λt) and a country
ﬁxed effect (ηi), with εti as an error term. All variables are in logs so
their coefﬁcient estimates have a direct elasticity interpretation. To
allow for different slopes across the high-income, the middle-income,
and the low-income country groups, the estimation also includes
the interaction between Variety Growth and Income group dummy
variables.
Table 1 reports the results from LSDV ﬁxed effects, GMM dynamic
panel (Arellano and Bond, 1991), and the dynamic panel with 5-year
average variety growth. The average number of years per country is 12
so the dynamic panel is the most appropriate (Judson and Owen,
1999). Lagged political conﬂict has a positive effect on the current
one as expected. Based on the R2 of the LSDV ﬁxed effects, this
econometric speciﬁcation is able to explain around 70% of political
conﬂicts across countries during the sample period. Variety Growth is
negatively associated with the internal, the external, and the overall
political conﬂicts. The effects of variety growth are non-linear: coef-
ﬁcient estimates of the Variety Growth×Income interaction terms are
positive and larger for lower income groups. This does not necessarily
mean the effect of variety growth is a decreasing function of income:
its economic signiﬁcance will vary with its standard deviation across
the income groups.Fig. 1. Trade variety and political conﬂict. Average number of importing sources per importe
scale lines in logs, higher ICRG score = more conﬂicts).Eq. (1) is then estimated with the variety growth of three broad
product categories according to Rauch (1999)'s classiﬁcation: differ-
entiated products (n), reference priced products (r), and organized
exchange products (w). The correlations between the aggregate
variety growth and that of n, r, w are 0.69, 0.61, 0.43, respectively.d product (left-scale bars at 4-digit SITC) and average score on political conﬂict (right-
Table 2
Economic signiﬁcance
Political conﬂict Conﬂict-reducing effect (%) by income group
Trade variety Middle-income Low-income
Internal n −5.1 −10.5
r −5.1 −10.1
w −3.7 −8.4
External n −1.4 −2.7
r −1.2 −4.0
w −1.0 −7.6
Overall n − .9 −2.1
r −1.1 −2.4
w − .9 −2.2
n: differentiated products; r: reference priced products; w: organized exchange
products. For each trade variety and income group, the conﬂict-reducing effect of
variety growth is calculated by multiplying a 1-standard deviation increase of the
variety growth with its coefﬁcient estimate from the GMM dynamic panel using 5-year
average variety growth (Table 1, bottom panel).
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group by multiplying a 1-standard deviation increase of the variety
growth with its coefﬁcient estimates from the GMM dynamic panel
estimation (using 5-year average variety growth; Table 1, bottom
panel). The conﬂict-reducing gains from variety growth are larger for
the low-income countries (8.4–10.5%) in comparison to the gains for
the middle-income countries (3.7–5.1%). Further, the gains are larger
on the internal conﬂicts,3 and have a similar size across the Rauch's
product classiﬁcation.
3. Related studies and limitations
These new ﬁndings of the conﬂict-reducing gains from trade
variety cut across at least two strands of the literature. The ﬁrst strand
studies potential welfare gains from international trade through the
import of new varieties. Broda andWeinstein (2004) ﬁnd that the U.S.
consumers gain from increased import variety via the variety-
adjusted import price reduction. The second strand examines whether
globalization offers an extra beneﬁts by pacifying international
relations. Martin et al. (2008) ﬁnd that regional and bilateral trade
agreements decrease the probability of wars and thus have some
positive consequences for political relations. This paper adds to the
literature by providing the evidence that larger variety – the extensive
margin – of international trade is also associated with lower political
conﬂicts. Excluding exports would bias downward the effects of
variety growth.4 Yet, the analysis is only half of the story: future
studies delve further into the role of quality, survival and deepening of
trade relationship along the lines of Besedes and Prusa (2007) and
Hummels and Klenow (2005) will be useful.3 The correlation between the internal and the external conﬂicts is .58.
4 The import statistics tend to be more accurate than the export due to its necessity
for tariff collection. However, the signiﬁcance of re-exports in some countries for
entrepôt trade may complicate the measurement.Two limitations are in order. First, there may be a reverse causality
frompolitical conﬂict to trade variety.5 Using two cross-country survey
data sets,Mayda andRodrik (2005)ﬁnd that nationalismand the lower
level of human capital are associated with protectionist tendencies.
Dutt and Mitra (2005) also ﬁnd that government ideology may affect
trade policy, with the right-wing tends to adopt more protectionist in
labor-rich countries, than the right-wing. Second, the paper does not
pertain to control for all possible common factors driving simulta-
neously political conﬂict and variety growth, i.e. the diversity of
population (Grossman and Maggi, 2000), the quality of institutions
(Nunn, 2007), the role of immigration and business networks
(Moenius et al., 2007). The main ﬁndings of this paper also suggest
that it would be useful to extend the analysis into the mechanism
behind the relationship between the extensive margin and the risk of
conﬂicts. For example, the empirical framework in this paper can be
readily extended to test whether the extensive margin still affects the
probability of conﬂict, after controlling for trade openness and regional
trade agreements.6
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